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I Introduction 
Ever since the case of the lift-driver who accused the New South 
Wales Commissioner for Main Roads of sexually harassing her,1 
Australian anti-discrimination tribunals have demanded that 
complainants prove their case to the ‘Briginshaw standard of 
proof’.2  
In fact, ‘standard’ is a misnomer as in the common law there are 
only two standards of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt for 
criminal cases and on the balance of probabilities for civil. As anti-
discrimination complaints raise civil issues, the appropriate 
standard is the balance of probabilities,3 though what that term 
means is by no means clear. It is generally accepted that it will 
require ‘satisfaction on the evidence that the matter found to have 
occurred is more likely than not to have occurred.’4 The standard 
goes to the degree of persuasion of the mind:  
No matter how grave the fact which is to be found in a civil 
case, the mind has only to be reasonably satisfied and has 
not with respect to any matter in issue in such a proceeding 
                                      
 
1 O’Callaghan v Loder [1984] EOC ¶92-024.  
2 The ‘Briginshaw standard of proof’ was articulated in the High Court decision of Briginshaw 
v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 (‘Briginshaw’). As this article makes clear, the test is more a 
means of highlighting the standard of required evidence in civil cases than an actual standard 
of proof. 
3 O’Callaghan v Loder [1984] EOC ¶92-024, 75 511 (Mathews J, Members Thiering and 
Swinbourne).  
4 John Dyson Heydon, Cross on Evidence (6th ed, 2000) 247. 
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to attain that degree of certainty which is indispensable to the 
support of a conviction upon a criminal charge.5  
However, the Briginshaw principle recognises that in relation to a 
civil matter, ‘questions of fact vary greatly in nature and in some 
cases greater care in scrutinizing the evidence is proper than in 
others, and a greater clearness of proof may be properly looked 
for.’6  
This article examines the scope of the Briginshaw principle both 
within and outside the anti-discrimination jurisdiction and suggests 
ways in which equal opportunity tribunals could conform more 
closely to appellate court commentary and direction.  
II Briginshaw 
In Briginshaw,7 Mr Briginshaw sought to divorce his wife on the 
grounds of her adultery. The only evidence he could produce was 
Mrs Briginshaw’s admission that she had kissed the co-respondent 
and hearsay evidence that a friend of Mr Briginshaw’s sister had 
been told in confidence by the co-respondent that he and Mrs 
Briginshaw had engaged in sexual intercourse. The judge refused 
to grant a divorce on the grounds that he was not satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that adultery had taken place. The petitioner 
appealed to the High Court arguing that the criminal standard of 
proof should not be applied in divorce cases. The Full Court of the 
High Court agreed: adultery was not a criminal offence. 
Nevertheless, as a finding of adultery would have grave 
consequences for the respondent — intimations of immorality and 
loss of status as a married woman8 — the evidence against her 
should be clear and compelling. On that test, the evidence, even if 
admissible, lacked cogency. The husband’s petition was rejected. 
The circumstances in which the test would be necessary were less 
clear. Rich J said it depended on ‘common sense and worldly 
wisdom’:9  
                                      
 
5 Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521–2 (Barwick CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and 
Windeyer JJ). 
6 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192, 216 (Dixon J). 
7 (1938) 60 CLR 336.  
8 Ibid 372 (McTiernan J).  
9 Ibid 350. 
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In a serious matter like a charge of adultery the satisfaction 
of a just and prudent mind cannot be produced by slender 
and exiguous proofs or circumstances pointing with a 
wavering finger to an affirmative conclusion. The nature of 
the allegation requires as a matter of common sense and 
worldly wisdom the careful weighing of testimony, the close 
examination of facts proved as a basis of inference and a 
comfortable satisfaction that the tribunal has reached both a 
correct and just conclusion.10 
Dixon J gave a little more guidance:  
Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, 
it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out 
to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable 
satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or 
established independently of the nature and consequence of 
the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an 
allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence 
of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences 
flowing from a particular finding are considerations which 
must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has 
been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In 
such matters ‘reasonable satisfaction’ should not be 
produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect 
inferences. Everyone must feel that, when, for instance, the 
issue is on which of two dates an admitted occurrence took 
place, a satisfactory conclusion may be reached on materials 
of a kind that would not satisfy any sound and prudent 
judgment if the question was whether some act had been 
done involving grave moral delinquency.11  
The Briginshaw approach is based on the principle that a court in a 
civil action should not lightly find that a party has engaged in 
criminal conduct.12 As accusations of wrongdoing usually involve 
serious consequences for the defendant, justice demands that the 
accuser, whether in civil or criminal matters, carries the burden of 
proof to the requisite standard. It is not surprising that this issue 
                                      
 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid 361–2.  
12 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449, 449–50 (Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
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was at the forefront of Dixon J’s mind in Briginshaw, as he had but 
recently commented on it extra-curially in relation to Australian 
criminal law.13  
Briginshaw therefore directs a court to proceed cautiously in a civil 
case where a serious allegation has been made or the facts are 
improbable. If the finding is likely to produce grave consequences, 
the evidence should be of high probative value. The Briginshaw 
test focuses attention on the standard of the evidence required to 
prove the case to the ordinary civil standard — it is not a change in 
the standard of proof. There is no third standard of proof in the 
common law. More proof means nothing more than better 
evidence.14 
III High Court limits on the Briginshaw test 
In Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd,15 Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ reviewed the authorities to 
provide a clear statement of the Briginshaw principle: 
The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears 
the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the 
balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the 
matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud.16 On 
the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to 
establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may 
vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. 
Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the 
effect that clear17 or cogent18 or strict19 proof is necessary 
                                      
 
13 Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Development of the Law of Homicide’ (Speech delivered at the First 
Convention of the Law Council of Australia, Melbourne, 31 October 1935). Sir Owen Dixon 
was discussing the recently decided English case of Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 and 
Sankey LC’s famous ‘golden thread’ speech (at 481).  
14 Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service [2002] NSWADT 133 (Unreported, Judicial 
Member Rice, Members Alt and McDonald, 6 August 2002) [47]. 
15 (1992) 110 ALR 449, 449–50 (citations in original).  
16 See, eg, Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430, 500 (Dixon J); Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 
CLR 517, 519–21.  
17 Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 362 (Dixon J); Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691, 701 
(Starke J); Hocking v Bell (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 468, 477 (Davidson J); aff’d (1945) 71 CLR 
430, 464 (Latham CJ), 500 (Dixon J); Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521; Wentworth 
v Rogers [No 5] (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, 539 (Kirby P).  
18 Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521. 
19 Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC 298, 300 (Lord Buckmaster); Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 
362 (Dixon J); Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691, 711 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ); 
Hocking v Bell (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 468, 478 (Davidson J); aff’d (1945) 71 CLR 430, 464 
(Latham CJ), 500 (Dixon J); Wentworth v Rogers [No 5] (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, 538 (Kirby P).  
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‘where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found’.20 
Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood 
as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be 
understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception 
that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in 
fraudulent or criminal conduct21 and a judicial approach that 
a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance 
of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of 
such conduct. 
Their Honours warned that indiscriminate generalisations about 
the need for clear and cogent evidence, even where the standard 
of proof was correctly understood, were ‘likely to be unhelpful and 
even misleading’.22  
A further limitation was expressed in G v H.23 The issue in this 
case was whether a man should pay maintenance for the child of a 
prostitute who had engaged in sexual intercourse with 250 clients 
during the period under review. While paternity was ‘a serious 
matter, both for father and for child’,24 it was a biological fact which 
could be proved by other means. It was not an allegation of moral 
or criminal wrongdoing which involved an issue of importance or 
gravity in the Briginshaw sense.25  
McHugh J has elsewhere asserted that the Briginshaw test can 
apply to all causes of civil action, including primary negligence if 
the situation warrants it.26 However, in an exchange with the New 
South Wales Solicitor-General in Witham v Holloway, he was 
clearly impatient with Briginshaw being invoked at every turn: 
there are only two standards of proof: balance of probabilities 
and proof beyond reasonable doubt. I know Briginshaw is 
cited like it was some ritual incantation. It has never 
impressed me too much. I mean, it really means no more 
than, ‘Oh, we had better look at this a bit more closely than 
                                      
 
20 Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521.  
21 See, eg, Motchall v Massoud [1926] VLR 273, 276 (Irvine CJ).  
22 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449, 450.  
23 (1994) 181 CLR 387.  
24 Ibid 399 (Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ).  
25 Ibid 399–400 (Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ).  
26 Transcript of Proceedings, Rosecrance v Rosecrance (High Court of Australia, McHugh J, 
18 June 1999).  
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we might otherwise’, but it is still a balance of probabilities in 
the end.27  
For her part, Gaudron J observed that this was ‘an ordinary 
case’.28 She noted that Briginshaw was only appropriate where 
there was an allegation of a very serious nature in a civil case and 
the consequences were such that the standard should be 
elevated. This did not appear to be such a case.29  
IV The scope of the Briginshaw principle in non-
discrimination cases  
The routine application of Briginshaw to anti-discrimination cases 
is misplaced. To illustrate this, I propose to look at its use in other 
jurisdictions. In these jurisdictions, it is applied only to allegations 
of serious misconduct made in civil proceedings or where the 
consequences flowing from a particular finding may be permanent 
or damaging to parties in civil litigation. In both situations, the 
underlying rationale is the gravity of the outcome for the defendant. 
A Allegations of Serious Misconduct in Civil Proceedings 
1 Murder 
In a sensational 1940s case, Helton v Allen,30 Allen alleged that 
Helton had murdered her daughter Margaret for her money. 
Margaret Roche had been having an open and scandalous sexual 
relationship with Helton, who was considerably younger than her. 
Helton knew the terms of Roche’s recently made will: most of her 
considerable estate would pass to him. Roche died suddenly and 
painfully of strychnine poisoning after dining with Helton. Helton 
was tried twice for murdering Roche. At the first trial, he was found 
guilty but the conviction was quashed on the ground that there had 
been a mistrial. On the second occasion, he was acquitted by the 
jury.  
                                      
 
27 Transcript of Proceedings, Witham v Holloway (High Court of Australia, McHugh J, 10 
February 1995).  
28 Transcript of Proceedings, Witham v Holloway (High Court of Australia, Gaudron J, 10 
February 1995). 
29 Ibid.  
30 (1940) 63 CLR 691. 
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Allen challenged Helton’s right of succession on the grounds that 
public policy should prevent a person who kills another from taking 
a benefit under the deceased’s will. The issue was heard by a civil 
jury which found on the balance of probabilities that Helton had 
killed Roche and therefore could not inherit. Helton appealed to the 
High Court. He argued that there was insufficient evidence and 
that his acquittal meant that the public policy did not apply. The 
Court rejected these grounds. However, it reluctantly found for 
Helton on the ground that there had been a misdirection to the jury 
on the standard of proof. In summing up, the judge had seemed to 
indicate that if the jury found the probabilities were slightly weighed 
against Helton then they should find for Allen. Their Honours 
approved31 Dixon J’s statements in Briginshaw and ordered a re-
trial.  
2 Sexual Abuse of Children 
In a significant proportion of custody cases in the Family Court one 
parent will allege that the other, or a step-parent, has sexually 
abused the children and therefore should be denied custody or 
access.32 An incorrect finding against the accused parent will not 
only have a serious and damaging impact on that parent, but also 
on the child, who will be both deprived of contact and will suffer 
guilt and the psychological consequences of having a parent 
suspected of a heinous crime. In M v M,33 the wife alleged that the 
child’s welfare would be put at further risk if the father were to have 
access. The High Court noted that this was ‘an allegation which is 
often easy to make, but difficult to refute.’34 Their Honours directed 
that ‘the court should not make a positive finding that the allegation 
is true unless the court is so satisfied according to the civil 
standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in 
Briginshaw v Briginshaw’.35  
Nevertheless, their Honours indicated that, even if the allegation 
failed to meet the Briginshaw test, the judge may still refuse 
access if it were not in the best interests of the child.36 On that 
                                      
 
31 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691, 712 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).  
32 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Family Law and Parent-Child Contact: Assessing the Risk of Sexual 
Abuse’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 345. Parkinson estimates that the 
allegation is made in between one quarter and one half of all contested cases: at 346.  
33 (1988) 166 CLR 69.  
34 Ibid 77 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).   
35 Ibid 76.  
36 Ibid 77. 
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basis, the Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to deny the 
husband access. 
3 Gross Medical Negligence 
There were elements of both an allegation of grave misconduct 
and the ‘inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given 
description’37 in Hocking v Bell.38 The plaintiff alleged that a doctor 
had been grossly negligent in that he had left part of a rubber 
drainage tube in her neck and that it had passed to her stomach 
and was expelled some 18 months after the operation. She not 
only gave an inherently improbable description of the medical 
equipment but also of the journey of the tube. The High Court 
applied the Briginshaw test to the evidence and held by a majority 
that no reasonable jury could have found for the plaintiff. 
4 Fraud  
In Rejfek v McElroy,39 the plaintiffs demanded the rescission of a 
contract on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial 
judge believed that he was obliged to apply the criminal level of 
proof to the evidence. The High Court, referring to Briginshaw, 
held that no matter how grave the allegation in a civil case, the 
mind has only to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities, 
although 
[t]he ‘clarity’ of the proof required, where so serious a matter 
as fraud is to be found, is an acknowledgment that the 
degree of satisfaction for which the civil standard of proof 
calls may vary according to the gravity of the fact to be 
proved...40 
However, there is no call for Briginshaw where the allegation of 
fraud is trivial41 or merely involves the judge choosing between one 
party’s version of the facts and the other’s.42  
                                      
 
37 Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 362 (Dixon J).  
38 (1945) 71 CLR 430. 
39 (1965) 112 CLR 517.  
40 Ibid 521.  
41 Maher v Wall [2000] SASC 176 (Unreported, Duggan J, 23 June 2000) (allegation of 
forgery of a motor vehicle disposal notice).  
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5 Serious and Wilful Conduct Warranting Dismissal 
Allegations of murder, sexual abuse of children, gross medical 
negligence and fraud obviously have no place in the anti-
discrimination jurisdiction. Unlawful dismissals, however, are 
common to both the anti-discrimination and the industrial relations 
jurisdictions. Both involve tribunals that are not bound by the rules 
of evidence. Though the examination in one is of the conduct of 
the employer, and in the other of the conduct of the employee, a 
comparison of the application of Briginshaw may be useful. 
In the anti-discrimination jurisdiction, the onus is on the dismissed 
employee to prove that a prohibited ground was a reason for the 
dismissal. Briginshaw is routinely applied because it is said that an 
allegation of discrimination or harassment is a serious matter.43 
However, this is by no means the same as an allegation with 
serious consequences for the respondent. Indeed, a survey of 
outcomes of successful complaints indicates that the most 
common consequence an employer is likely to face is an order to 
pay a modest sum in compensatory damages, because it was 
either personally or vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of 
its employees.44 A survey of compensation awarded by anti-
discrimination tribunals in 200145 shows a range between $250 
and $72 582, both for age discrimination in employment.46 The 
total damages for 29 successful cases was less than $600 000, 
providing an average in the order of $20 000 — in economic terms, 
hardly a grave consequence. Higher damages may be awarded 
where there has been physical sexual harassment.47 As for 
damage to the respondent’s reputation, it is suggested that it is 
probably only where the employer has failed to take reasonable 
steps to prevent sexual harassment that there is a possibility of 
                                                                                                            
 
42 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449, 450–1 (Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ) (competing and inconsistent financial figures in relation to a 
business).  
43 See, eg, Smith v Hehir [2001] EOC ¶93-165, 75 571 (Member Tahmindjis); Menzies v 
Waycott [2001] EOC ¶93-129, 75 247 (Senior Member Lyons).  
44 See ‘Resolution of Disputes’ in CCH, Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law 
and Practice, vol 1 (at 1 August 2003) 72 273–459.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Bloomfield v Westco Jeans Pty Ltd [2001] EOC ¶93-161 ($250); Skinner v Lightning Bolt 
Pty Ltd [2001] EOC ¶93-167 ($72 582, not altered on appeal).  
47 Shiels v James [2000] FMCA 2 (Unreported, Federal Magistrate Raphael, 13 September 
2000).  
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damage to reputation.48 It is otherwise suggested that nothing 
more will attach to the employer’s future reputation than if a finding 
was made that an employee had driven carelessly and caused a 
minor accident. 
By contrast, in the industrial relations jurisdiction, the onus is on 
the employee to prove unfair dismissal and on the employer to 
establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the misconduct, 
which may fall short of criminal behaviour, was serious and wilful 
enough to justify refusing to reinstate the employee.49 The 
industrial relations tribunal or commission will not lightly uphold the 
employer’s decision to dismiss because the outcome will be that 
the employee loses both job and reputation. Nevertheless, 
Briginshaw is only applied to the most serious allegations, such as 
that made in the New South Wales Police Royal Commission that 
a detective senior constable was corrupt,50 or that an employee 
stole from his employer on a grand scale so he could set up his 
own business in competition using the employer’s materials.51 
These accusations were not only of illegal activity but also of 
undermining the very fabric of the employer’s enterprise.  
Briginshaw will not apply where there has been no allegation of 
misconduct. In Four Sons Pty Ltd v Sakchai Limsiripothong,52 the 
Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Commission of New South 
Wales noted that the tribunal must ‘consider the nature and 
seriousness of the allegation made before finding it proved at the 
requisite level.’53 On that test, the issue of whether the employee 
had been dismissed because there was a downturn in business or 
because he was being victimised for supporting a fellow employee 
who complained of sexual harassment did not require the 
Briginshaw approach, as there were no allegations of fraud or 
criminal conduct.  
B Where the Outcome of the Decision May Be Irreversible 
                                      
 
48 For an example from the area of the provision of goods and services, see Evans v Lee 
[1996] EOC ¶92-822, 79 055–7 (Commissioner Jones).  
49 See, eg, Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) pt VIA; Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) pt 
3.  
50 Bigg v NSW Police Service (1998) 80 IR 434, 456 (Bauer and Schmidt JJ and 
Commissioner Murphy).  
51 Wang v Crestell Industries Pty Ltd (1997) 73 IR 454, 463–4 (Cahill V-P, Hill J and 
Commissioner French). 
52 (2000) 98 IR 1. 
53 Ibid 7 (Wright P, Hungerford J and Commissioner Cambridge). 
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The second category of non-discrimination cases that enlivens the 
Briginshaw principle involves the possibility of permanent 
consequences for the respondent civil party. 
1 Loss of Liberty 
In R v Schafferius,54 Schafferius was being held in a security 
hospital after the Queensland Mental Health Tribunal found him to 
be of unsound mind and unfit to plead. He claimed this was untrue. 
The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the Tribunal’s decision, 
noting that because the consequence was loss of personal liberty 
this was a ‘proceeding at the “grave” end of the Briginshaw 
principle.’55 The Court held that the Tribunal had correctly made its 
decision on clear and convincing evidence. 
At 21, Derek Percy was put on trial for the rape, mutilation and 
murder of a child. At trial he was found not fit to plead by reason of 
insanity. By 1998 he had been held in prison custody for over 29 
years and was the only person in Victoria still subject to a 
‘Governor’s pleasure’ order. Eames J of the Victorian Supreme 
Court was appointed to review the case.56 Because Percy had 
been found not to be suffering from a mental impairment he could 
not be transferred to a psychiatric hospital; therefore, Eames J’s 
choices were release or further incarceration. His Honour held that 
the relevant legislation required him to be satisfied on the balance 
of probabilities but ‘with the gloss of Briginshaw’57 that the detainee 
would pose no risk to the community if he were released. His 
Honour held that the evidence available was insufficient to reach 
this degree of satisfaction and so the prisoner would be obliged to 
remain in custody with periodic reviews.58 
Personal liberty was also in issue where a man was being held in 
custody in South Australia awaiting extradition to face criminal 
charges in Canada.59 Gary MacDonald denied that he was the 
wanted man and brought a writ of habeas corpus against the 
Australian government.60 Applying the Briginshaw test, Walters J 
                                      
 
54 (1987) 1 Qd R 381.  
55 Ibid 383 (Thomas J). 
56 Re Major Reviews of Percy, Farrell and R J O (1998) 102 A Crim R 554.  
57 Ibid 567. 
58 Re Major Review of Percy (1998) 104 A Crim R 29.  
59 MacDonald v A-G (Cth) (1980) 24 SASR 294.  
60 Ibid 308–9. 
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was convinced on the evidence before him — photographs, 
identical scarring and similarity of fingerprints — that the prisoner 
could be held awaiting extradition.61  
2 Sterilisation of Young Women  
The Briginshaw test was implicitly approved by Deane J in 
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v J W B 
and S M B62 in relation to each of the conditions precedent for the 
sterilisation of a severely intellectually impaired girl. He held that 
the judges of the Family Court must have clear and convincing 
evidence from a multi-disciplinary team that there is severe 
disability, that the woman would be unable to care for herself or a 
child, and that the surgery is necessary because there was no 
other medical alternative.63 
3 Whether a Person Is of a Particular Race  
In Shaw v Wolf,64 the petitioners alleged that Wolf and 10 others 
were not entitled to stand as candidates for election to the 
Regional Council of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (‘ATSIC’) as they were not Aboriginal. Merkel J of the 
Federal Court determined that the onus of proof lay on the 
petitioners and while the ordinary civil standard of proof was 
appropriate, the Briginshaw principle should apply because of the 
severe and deeply personal impact which a finding of non-
Aboriginality would have on the respondents’ identity, family and 
communal relationships as well as on any entitlements to 
participate in programs and organisations for the benefit of 
Aboriginal people.65 His Honour noted that the Briginshaw principle 
might not be appropriate where a respondent had suddenly 
announced an Aboriginal identity for the purpose of standing in an 
ATSIC election, but that was not the case here where all 
respondents had identified as Aboriginal prior to any suggestion 
that they stand as candidates.66  
                                      
 
61 Ibid 302.  
62 (1992) 175 CLR 218 (‘Marion’s Case’). Deane J cited (at 305) with approval the application 
of Briginshaw in Re Jane (1988) 94 FLR 1, 20–1 (Nicholson CJ).  
63 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 305. 
64 (1999) 163 ALR 205. 
65 Ibid 216. 
66 Ibid. 
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After meticulous analysis of the evidence of self-identification, 
community identification and Aboriginal descent,67 his Honour held 
that the petitioners had proved that two of the respondents were 
not Aboriginal for the purposes of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth).68 Like sterilisation, the 
decision would radically alter those respondents’ lives. 
4 Doctors and Lawyers Struck off or Suspended from Their 
Professional Roll  
Even though disciplinary proceedings before a professional 
tribunal do not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, the 
Briginshaw test is appropriate in such circumstances because the 
outcome may end the person’s professional career. In Re a 
Solicitor; Ex parte The Prothonotary,69 decided shortly after 
Briginshaw, a solicitor was asked to show cause why he should 
not be removed from the roll of solicitors after allegations of fraud 
and perjury. Jordan CJ held that in determining whether a crime or 
grave moral delinquency had occurred, circumstantial evidence 
was not sufficient unless there was no other reasonably probable 
explanation. His Honour was satisfied on the Briginshaw principle 
that the preponderance of evidence pointed to the commission of 
the crimes.70  
The Briginshaw approach was adopted by Hudson J in Hobart v 
Medical Board of Victoria71 in relation to an allegation that a 
medical practitioner had engaged in an improper relationship with 
the wife of his medical partner and had supplied her with drugs to 
kill herself. The doctor was struck off.  
In Kerin v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee,72 the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia upheld a decision to 
remove a legal practitioner who had unlawfully imported firearms, 
                                      
 
67 This three-part test of Aboriginality was proposed by Deane J in Commonwealth v 
Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 273–4 (‘Tasmanian Dams Case’).  
68 One respondent failed to appear or file any pertinent information, while the other 
unsuccessful respondent failed to provide cogent genealogical evidence linking her to any 
known Aboriginal family. Even though she identified herself as Aboriginal and there was some 
community recognition of her status, Merkel J held that the petitioners had discharged their 
onus of proof: Shaw v Wolf (1999) 163 ALR 205, 233–9.  
69 (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 53. This case was relied upon by the lawyers for the Commissioner 
for Main Roads in O’Callaghan v Loder [1984] EOC ¶92-024, discussed below in Part V(A). 
70 Re a Solicitor; Ex parte The Prothonotary (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 53, 54.  
71 [1966] VR 292, 296.  
72 (1996) 67 SASR 149.  
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failed to advise a client to obtain independent legal advice when 
there was a conflict of interest and had misled the Legal 
Practitioners Complaints Committee. Millhouse J unhelpfully added 
the type of statement which creates confusion in the minds of anti-
discrimination tribunal members, stating that ‘[t]he Briginshaw onus 
is heavier than “on the balance of probabilities” but not as heavy 
as “beyond reasonable doubt” — where it lies on the scale 
depends upon the case.’73 
In sum it can be said that Briginshaw is enlivened where there are 
serious accusations (murder, sexual abuse of children, corruption, 
undermining the very business of your employer, adultery prior to 
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), gross medical negligence or fraud) 
or where the effect of the finding would be permanent and 
damaging to the respondent’s future (loss of liberty, racial identity, 
sexual functioning or profession). These are clearly issues of 
gravity and importance that warrant a closer scrutiny of the 
evidence before a decision adverse to the respondent is made. 
V Briginshaw in the anti-discrimination jurisdiction 
By contrast with the other jurisdictions, anti-discrimination tribunals 
apply the Briginshaw approach as a matter of course.74 The 
‘standard of proof is the Briginshaw test’.75 The basis for this 
approach seems to be the general belief that any allegation of 
discrimination or harassment is a ‘serious matter’.76 The following 
statement provides an example: 
It is now clearly established in Australian anti-discrimination 
law that this burden of proof is subject to the application of 
the test set out in Briginshaw v Briginshaw ... This means 
that the more serious the allegations are, it may be 
reasonable to expect a complainant to prove the case 
beyond a slight difference in probity when weighing the 
evidence. Allegations of sexual harassment are serious 
                                      
 
73 Ibid 153. 
74 For example, in Ebber v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 129 
ALR 455, Drummond J stated that ‘a finding of unlawful conduct could only be made against 
the respondents if it was proved to the standard referred to in Briginshaw v Briginshaw’: at 
468.  
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matters. Therefore, the complainant in this case must 
establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the events as 
alleged by her occurred, and at a level greater than the 
merest difference in the balance of probabilities.77 
This blanket approach does not allow for the fact that each case 
should depend on its own facts. It offers no continuum of severity 
of allegation or gravity of outcome. It implies that any accusation of 
sexual harassment carries the same consequences as an 
accusation of a serious crime or will have a permanent and 
irreversible effect on the respondent’s future. It also suggests that 
discrimination requires a higher level of proof than the balance of 
probabilities.  
In Four Sons Pty Ltd v Sakchai Limsiripothong78 the Full Bench of 
the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission observed 
that to apply Briginshaw indiscriminately was to harbour 
a fundamental misconception of the test and scheme of the 
Act relating to unfair dismissals. For example, a conclusion 
that a dismissal was harsh, unreasonable, or unjust does not 
necessarily involve any finding of legally or morally 
reprehensible conduct on the part of the employer. It may be 
sufficient, for example, to find the test met where the conduct 
of the employer, or the circumstances of the dismissal, result 
in a situation where the dismissal viewed objectively can be 
said to be harsh, unreasonable, or unjust. That does not 
involve necessarily a finding as to the employer’s intent, or 
that the employer has acted reprehensibly, illegally, or 
fraudulently. Indeed, such a finding could arise from mere 
inadvertence on the employer’s part.79  
The same observation could equally be applied to the scheme of 
anti-discrimination legislation.80 The legislation protects against 
harassment, vilification and two types of discrimination: direct, 
                                      
 
77 Smith v Hehir [2001] EOC ¶93-165, 75 571 (Member Tahmindjis). This statement of law 
was not challenged on appeal to the Supreme Court of Queensland.  
78 (2000) 98 IR 1.  
79 Ibid 8. 
80 See, eg, Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
(Cth); Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT); Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW); Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1991 (Qld); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas); Equal 
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where one person treats another less favourably on the basis of a 
particular attribute, for example, race or gender; and indirect, 
meant to deal with the adverse impact which certain apparently 
neutral, but unreasonable, practices or policies may have on 
particular groups. For example, a requirement to enter a public 
building by the means of stairs will have an adverse effect on the 
disabled, the elderly and parents with prams and strollers.81 
Indirect discrimination is usually the result of the unthinking 
application of set ways of doing things. Nevertheless, the 
Briginshaw test has been applied to both direct82 and indirect83 
discrimination. It might be suggested, however, that an allegation 
of malice as opposed to one of mere inadvertence would go to the 
seriousness of the consequence for the respondent.84  
In my view, the blanket Briginshaw approach evolved from the first 
anti-discrimination cases. They raised issues never before argued 
in Australia — sexual harassment and systemic discrimination. 
The respondents were well-known and highly-placed persons 
whose reputation as fair-minded citizens was at stake. I suggest 
that these circumstances combined to settle the Briginshaw 
standard in this jurisdiction. 
A Setting the Standard: Early Anti-Discrimination Cases 
The sensational nature of the complaint and the difference in 
status between the parties in O’Callaghan v Loder,85 the first 
sexual harassment case reported in Australia, focused public 
attention on the evidence given to the hearing body, the New 
South Wales Equal Opportunity Tribunal. What distinguishes 
sexual harassment is that it is unwelcome: the anti-discrimination 
legislation does not intend to outlaw consensual sexual conduct.86 
                                      
 
81 Cocks v Queensland [1994] EOC ¶92-612.  
82 See, eg, Djokic v Sinclair [1994] ¶EOC 92-643, 77 419 (Wilson P); Ebber v Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 129 ALR 455, 467–8 (Drummond J); Borg v 
Commissioner, Department of Corrective Services [2002] EOC ¶93-198, 76 342 (Goode P, 
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83 See, eg, Scott v Telstra [1995] EOC ¶92-717, 78 398 (Wilson P); Tocigl v Aitco Pty Ltd 
[1996] EOC ¶92-775, 78 762 (Wilson P); Rhodes v Calendula Pty Ltd [2002] EOC ¶93-181, 
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84 However, there is no need to prove intent or motive in complaints of discrimination. With 
respect to sexual harassment there is an objective test, except in Queensland, which offers 
the choice of an objective test or proof of an intention to harass: Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 
(Qld) s 119(e).  
85 [1984] EOC ¶92-024.  
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Both parties gave evidence that the employee had visited the 
Commissioner for Main Roads in his office suite on a number of 
occasions but there were no other material witnesses to the nature 
of the relationship. In a delicate area of human interaction, how 
should the Tribunal find out whether the Commissioner’s admitted 
conduct was unwelcome to the employee? The answer was, of 
course, very carefully indeed. 
The Commissioner argued that as the employee’s allegation of 
harassment was tantamount to one of criminal assault, proof 
should be beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Tribunal held 
that although unlawful conduct under the Anti-Discrimination Act 
1977 (NSW) may raise the ‘spectre of the criminal law’, the inquiry 
was of the nature of a civil claim.87 No sanctions other than 
awarding damages or issuing injunctions could attach to an 
adverse finding against a respondent and, therefore, the civil 
standard of proof on the balance of probabilities should apply to 
discrimination cases.88  
As to the nature of that proof, the lawyers for the Commissioner 
relied on Re a Solicitor; Ex parte The Prothonotary89 where the 
solicitor was under threat of being struck off. Implicitly drawing a 
parallel with their client’s situation where a finding against him 
would also seriously damage his career and reputation, they 
submitted that the Briginshaw test was appropriate. The Tribunal 
agreed: 
We accordingly propose to apply the ordinary civil standard 
of proof in this inquiry, but to take account of the gravity of 
the allegations and the serious consequences to a 
respondent following any adverse finding of this Tribunal, 
when we are determining whether the evidence meets that 
standard.90  
Applying this approach to the evidence available, it could be seen 
that the potentially defamatory accusation of criminal conduct had 
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grave consequences for the Commissioner.91 The Tribunal should 
only be convinced by clear and unequivocal evidence, which was 
lacking in this case. The complainant’s case was dismissed, but 
not before the parties’ private lives were publicly aired, which as 
the Tribunal noted was ‘a personal tragedy for both of them.’92 
In drawing on these principles, the Tribunal was developing a point 
made the previous year by Hutley JA of the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Director-General of Education v Breen.93 He 
had warned of the ‘very serious consequences which can flow 
from an adverse finding by the Equal Opportunity Tribunal’.94 
However, that case had raised issues of systemic discrimination in 
the application of departmental polices to women; it was hardly an 
accusation of misconduct against the Director-General. On appeal 
to the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the Tribunal’s findings in 
favour of the complainants were overturned on the basis that the 
evidence did not meet the standard required to deal with ‘three 
serious allegations against a high public officer’.95 Hutley JA held 
that ‘on no score’ did the findings measure up to the standards laid 
down by the High Court in Briginshaw.96 The Tribunal had shown 
‘no proper regard to the standards of proof required’:97 material 
admitted by the Tribunal did not directly bear on the unlawful act 
alleged. Therefore, the Tribunal’s finding that the complainants’ 
argument had sufficient ‘merit’ to find in their favour was an error of 
law. 
Hutley JA’s reference to Briginshaw was taken by the Tribunal in 
O’Callaghan v Loder to mean that any allegation of discrimination 
or harassment would be of serious consequence to the 
respondent.98 No distinction was made between the nature of the 
allegations — one where the Director-General was implementing 
policy in the course of his duties, the other where the 
Commissioner had engaged in an illicit sexual relationship. Nor 
was a line drawn between an allegation of less favourable 
treatment which may have amounted to a criminal assault, and the 
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policy implementation of a sincerely-held departmental belief that 
women were more suitable for teaching in infants’ schools 
because of their inherently maternal natures. For both, the weight 
of evidence required to prove the complaint seemed to be in direct 
proportion to the status of the respondent. The outcome was that 
these two cases, O’Callaghan v Loder and Director-General of 
Education v Breen, set the Briginshaw benchmark that has been 
the standard applied in anti-discrimination cases ever since. 
B ‘No Badge of Honour’: High Profile Respondents 
Subsequent cases involving high profile respondents maintained 
the belief that the Briginshaw standard was the routine test for all 
cases. In the early period of the legislation’s operation,99 
complaints were common against government or business 
enterprise, perhaps because the legislation was achieving its 
objective of educating the public about institutionalised 
discriminatory practices or, more cynically, because such 
organisations were perceived to have ‘deep pockets’.  
An early and highly influential case was Department of Health v 
Arumugam,100 heard by Fullagar J of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria. The case involved the issue of whether racial 
discrimination could be inferred from a decision by a selection 
panel not to appoint as psychiatrist superintendent of a 
government hospital an Indian-born doctor who had been acting in 
the position for six months. The gravity of the allegation was 
increased by the judge’s erroneous belief that the complainant had 
to prove that the respondent had a conscious intention to 
discriminate.101 In an often quoted passage102 his Honour 
expanded on the necessity for exercising caution where the 
respondent is a prominent person or organisation:  
                                      
 
99 The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) was the first statute to provide for civil remedies, 
followed by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SA) and the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
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the degree of satisfaction must be up to the seriousness of 
the allegations in all the circumstances: see the oft-cited 
remarks in Briginshaw ... It is, of course, a serious allegation 
that two prominent and highly-qualified medical men, in 
government positions of trust and responsibility, and 
engaged in the task of selecting the best man for a very 
important job which involved the highly-skilled care and 
management of sick people, deliberately rejected the best 
man and appointed a person known to them to be a far less 
suitable man, and did that substantially, if not entirely, on the 
ground that the better qualified professional man belonged to 
a particular race of human beings. Of course, it may 
nevertheless happen and, if it happens in the case of 
intelligent trained minds, one might expect some skilled 
attempt at concealment as well. But it is not lightly to be 
inferred.103  
In Australian Public Service Association v Australian Trade 
Commission,104 female public servants complained that a 
corporation set up by the Commonwealth government had 
indirectly discriminated against women by permitting only 
permanent members of staff to belong to a superannuation fund or 
to access a home loan subsidy scheme. Proportionally more men 
than women could comply with this requirement because most 
women were employed on a temporary basis. Though he doubted 
that the legislation required a strict onus of proof, Einfeld J 
nevertheless held that Briginshaw was relevant as an allegation 
against the corporation ‘should not be treated lightly.’105 
That the Briginshaw standard had become the accepted test by 
1992 is clear from the Western Australian case of D L 
(Representing the Members of People Living with AIDS (WA) Inc) 
v Perth City Council.106 An organisation which supported people 
with HIV applied to the Perth Council Town Planning Committee 
for approval to use premises in an area zoned for shopping as a 
daytime drop-in centre. The Committee refused approval by 13 
votes to 12, with one councillor abstaining. Of the 12 councillors 
who rejected the application, six had made their decision based on 
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the HIV status of the organisation’s members. People Living With 
AIDS (WA) Inc lodged a complaint of unlawful discrimination on 
the basis of impairment with the Western Australian Equal 
Opportunity Tribunal. At the hearing, the Council submitted that the 
Tribunal should pay ‘due regard to the gravity of the allegations 
and the potentially serious consequences to the Respondents of a 
finding adverse to them.’107 Counsel for the complainants ‘argued 
but faintly against that proposition, frankly acknowledging that ... 
the standard is the balance of probabilities, as explained by Dixon 
J in Briginshaw’.108 No argument against this proposition was 
presented in the appeals to the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia109 or to the High Court.110 The serious consequences of 
the outcome to the complainants were not placed in the balance. 
Jeff Kennett, then Premier of Victoria, was the respondent in 
Macedonian Teachers’ Association of Victoria Inc v Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission.111 He had issued a directive 
to his Ministers that they must refer to the language spoken by 
people either living in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, or originating from it, as Macedonian (Slavonic). The 
Macedonian Teachers’ Association of Victoria Inc (‘the 
Association’) took issue with this decision. It argued that nowhere 
else in the world was the language thus described, that it was 
linguistically incorrect and that the Victorian Macedonian 
community found the description deeply offensive and humiliating. 
The Association complained that the Premier had infringed the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) by singling out their language 
for less favourable treatment. Sir Ronald Wilson, then President of 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, clearly 
articulated the nexus between the status of the respondent and the 
requirement for a higher standard of proof: 
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Applying the test enunciated in Briginshaw ... if a finding in 
support of the complainant means that the Government must 
be found to have deliberately discriminated against one 
section of the community in order to favour another section 
and therefore be deserving of wide condemnation for such a 
lack of probity in office, then such a finding would surely call 
for proof based on more than a mere balance of 
probabilities.112  
This proposition formed one of the grounds of appeal by the 
Association to the Federal Court. Weinberg J dismissed it. Though 
it was ‘perhaps infelicitously expressed’, his Honour held that the 
Commissioner was not proposing a third standard of proof, rather 
he was giving no more than ‘a convenient shorthand method of 
articulating the Briginshaw principle’.113 He endorsed the view of 
special treatment for the highly placed: 
It is no badge of honour for any government to be found to 
have contravened a provision of an anti-discrimination 
statute. The fact that such a contravention may be found to 
have occurred without any intent on the part of that 
government to discriminate, and for laudatory motives, does 
not significantly diminish the gravity of any such finding.114  
On appeal, the Full Federal Court did not agree that the gravity of 
the accusation was in direct proportion to the status of the 
respondent: 
The mere finding that a government has contravened a 
provision of an anti-discrimination statute without considering 
the circumstances in which the contravention occurred is not, 
in our view, sufficient to attract the Briginshaw test. We 
disagree with his Honour’s conclusion that the absence of 
intention to discriminate does not significantly diminish the 
gravity of any such finding ... there are many examples of 
governments being held to have discriminated unlawfully 
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against individuals or groups of individuals without resort to 
the principle in Briginshaw ... [For example] Bacon v Victoria 
(unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 7 November 1997, 
Beach J) where the issue was whether the education policy 
of the Victorian government was discriminatory. Beach J held 
that it was, but his Honour did not invoke the Briginshaw 
principle. That case was similar, in principle, to this one. No 
issue of fraud or impropriety was raised or needed to be 
determined.115  
The Full Court had apparently put a stop to the special treatment 
for the highly placed, though a later, differently constituted Full 
Court in Sharma v Legal Aid Queensland116 applied Briginshaw 
without explaining the need for serious consequences. Nor did it 
refer to the High Court authorities. 
C Proof Falls below the Standard  
There are not many cases where it is overtly stated that the 
complainant has failed to establish proof on the Briginshaw test. 
The most important, both in terms of the number of persons 
affected and the interpretation of human rights, is Aboriginal 
Students’ Support and Parents Awareness Committee, Traeger 
Park Primary School, Alice Springs v Minister for Education, 
Northern Territory.117 The Northern Territory Minister for Education 
had decided to close down Traeger Park School which catered for 
fringe-dwellers in Alice Springs and to transfer the students to 
another school. The Minister had two reasons: first, that the school 
was not economically viable given the small classes, the high 
degree of absenteeism and the number of late attenders. The 
second was revealed in a response to an interviewer on the ABC’s 
7:30 Report, where he observed that it was a very unsatisfactory 
situation that all the students, except four, were Aboriginal. He said 
that it was in the long-term interests of Aboriginal children to learn 
to compete with white children and to take their place in the wider 
community.  
The School Committee complained under the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) alleging both direct and indirect 
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discrimination. Sections 9(1) (direct discrimination) and 9(1A)(c) 
(indirect) of the Act are drawn from the definition of racial 
discrimination in art 1(1) of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.118 The elements 
are notoriously difficult to prove; indeed, in Tocigl v Aitco Pty Ltd, 
Wilson P referred to the requirement to prove the seven elements 
of indirect discrimination in s 9(1A) plus ‘race’, field of public life, 
and the similar impact of the term or condition on persons of the 
same race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin as the 
complainant.119  
Though Commissioner Carter had misgivings, including that the 
Northern Territory government had acted as if no anti-
discrimination legislation applied there,120 he decided against the 
School Committee on the basis that its evidence did not reach the 
required standard to prove an impairment of the right to education: 
It must be borne in mind in this context that the 
establishment of such a breach [of s 9(1)] represents a 
finding of unlawfulness and that must be established in 
accordance with the standard of proof explained by the High 
Court of Australia in Briginshaw v Briginshaw. ... I have to be 
satisfied in accordance with the defined standard of proof ... 
Proof that some children will cope [in another school] and 
others may not for idiosyncratic reasons does not sufficiently 
satisfy the standard of proof. ... I cannot be satisfied in 
accordance with the required standard of proof that the 
decision itself, although based on race, was unlawful under 
sub-section 9(1).121  
The decision was not appealed. It could therefore be suggested 
that where proof of an element is a matter of degree (in this case 
to what extent the students’ right to education would be impaired 
by the act based on race), applying the Briginshaw standard may 
lead to the plaintiff failing to reach proof of that element.  
D Proof of Discrimination Is Largely Based on Inferences 
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The introduction of anti-discrimination legislation has modified 
public conduct. There are now fewer overt examples of racism and 
sexism; instead, discrimination is more subtle and often must be 
inferred from proven facts. For example, in Maghiar v Western 
Australia122 the complainant could prove his ethnicity and disability, 
and less favourable treatment by the Western Australian Police 
Service, but could not make the necessary causal connection 
between the two. At the point of examining whether an inference 
should be drawn from the facts, anti-discrimination tribunals will 
often refer to Briginshaw.123 In Sharma v Legal Aid Queensland,124 
the complainant argued that racial discrimination could be inferred 
from his failure to secure permanent positions within the 
organisation. His complaint was rejected at first instance for lack of 
proof. He appealed to the Full Federal Court.125 In a joint judgment, 
the Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that there were 
insufficient facts from which inferences of racial discrimination 
could be drawn — Sharma had not reached the requisite level of 
proof to the Briginshaw standard. The Court proffered the following 
information: 
It was common ground at first instance that the standard of 
proof for breaches of the RDA [Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth)] is the higher standard referred to in Briginshaw 
... Racial discrimination is a serious matter, which is not 
lightly to be inferred ... No contrary argument was put on the 
hearing of the appeal, apart from the comment that there is 
no binding authority on this Court that Briginshaw should be 
applied in cases of this nature.126  
But what was the nature of the case? Legal Aid Queensland was 
apparently going about its ordinary business of assessing job 
applications. If proved, Sharma’s allegation would be 
embarrassing for Legal Aid Queensland, but would not necessarily 
lead to permanent consequences. Similar issues were considered 
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in Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service.127 Dr Dutt, a senior 
specialist radiologist, alleged that he had been racially 
discriminated against in the workplace and victimised by his 
employer. The Health Service submitted that Dr Dutt must prove 
his case to the Briginshaw standard. The Equal Opportunities 
Division of the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal 
commented that 
it is commonly accepted, across a wide range of allegations 
and factual circumstances, that findings should be made 
according to the evidentiary requirements of Briginshaw. 
Presumably, but rarely explicitly, this reflects a view that 
allegations under the ADA [Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW)] are grave and that there will, for a respondent, be 
serious consequences of any adverse findings.128  
To ascertain whether the Briginshaw approach was necessary in 
this case the Tribunal proposed a simple two-step approach:  
1. Look at the nature of each allegation. Would it have 
reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences for the 
livelihood or reputation of the respondent?  
2. If so, then and only then, apply the Briginshaw test.129  
Applying the test to the facts, the Tribunal found that the case did 
not raise issues of importance and gravity in the Briginshaw sense. 
All but one of Dr Dutt’s allegations relied on inferences to be drawn 
from the conduct of a range of people going about their ordinary 
duties in the hospital. A finding of unlawful discrimination would be 
well short of finding that there had been criminal conduct, and 
would cause no apparent adverse consequence to the people 
concerned. An allegation that a government agency and its staff in 
its day-to-day duties had contravened an anti-discrimination 
statute was not sufficient to attract the Briginshaw approach. 
Even where Dr Dutt had alleged that another employee made an 
explicit reference to his race, the Tribunal held that this was hardly 
an allegation of criminal conduct. There was no reasonably 
foreseeable adverse consequence for the alleged perpetrator’s 
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livelihood. A finding against that person might cause him 
embarrassment and reflect on his personal reputation, but these 
were not grave consequences which warranted reliance on the 
Briginshaw standard. 
The Dutt test conforms with High Court authority.130 Its correct 
application in the anti-discrimination jurisdiction would confine 
Briginshaw to those cases where proof of the allegation would 
result in a serious outcome for the respondent. 
E ‘Without Regard to Technicalities and Legal Forms’: Preferred 
Evidentiary Procedures 
Given the body of jurisprudence which now clearly states that 
Briginshaw should only be applied in certain circumstances, why 
has the test remained as a general rule in the anti-discrimination 
jurisdiction? In a paper prepared for the twentieth anniversary of 
the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), 
Margaret Thornton claimed that the anti-discrimination tribunals 
were demanding a standard of proof beyond the civil standard, one 
which more approximated the criminal burden of proof.131 She 
argued that the reason for this extra burden on the complainant is 
that the tribunal members either ‘are not yet attuned to the 
meaning of the burden of proof in a non-judicial forum, or they are 
overly deferential to the hierarchy of appellate courts, ever ready to 
condemn deviations from legal form.’132 
Early on in the development of the jurisdiction, the President of the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Einfeld J, 
vigorously argued in three decisions on the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth)133 that the hearing process should be inquisitorial rather 
than adversarial as few complainants would have the experience 
in finding and presenting their own evidence: 
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131 Margaret Thornton, ‘Revisiting Race’ in Race Discrimination Commissioner, The Racial 
Discrimination Act: A Review (1995) 81, 95.  
132 Ibid.  
133 Australian Public Service Association v Australian Trade Commission [1988] EOC ¶92-
228, 77 165 (indirect discrimination); Erbs v Overseas Corporation Pty Ltd [1986] EOC ¶92-
181, 76 721 (direct discrimination); Bennett v Everitt [1988] EOC ¶92-244, 77 270 (sexual 
harassment).  
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It seems to me unlikely that Parliament had in mind when 
enacting these provisions the strict imposition by the 
Commission of an onus of proof on one party, usually the 
moving party, as applies in true civil litigation. It seems to me 
more likely that the Commission’s intended task is to try by 
all reasonable means at its disposal to discover and satisfy 
itself as to the facts; ie to inform itself on the complaint as 
fully as possible, perhaps preferably per medium of the 
parties but if necessary and in appropriate cases, through 
counsel assisting the Commission, with a view to 
determining the likely truth.134  
His Honour’s interpretation was not followed:135 the jurisdiction is 
clearly adversarial. However, Einfeld J had a valid point. The anti-
discrimination tribunals of the states and the Northern Territory are 
not bound by the rules of evidence.136 They may inform 
themselves on any matter they choose. The aim is to give the 
parties a reasonable opportunity to establish their cases without 
legalistic form. This, however, may not be apparent to the parties. 
Complainants are encouraged by the legislation to draft their own 
complaint137 and to proceed to conciliation without legal 
representation.138 However, if conciliation fails and they wish to 
resolve the issue at a public hearing, they are faced with a tribunal 
that demands the Briginshaw standard, a rule of evidence which is 
not clearly articulated and is incompletely understood even, as we 
have seen, by the tribunals themselves. A complainant’s evidence, 
possibly gathered by himself or herself, is now exposed to 
unnecessary pedantic legal scrutiny. 
                                      
 
134 Erbs v Overseas Corporation Pty Ltd [1986] EOC ¶92-181, 76 721.  
135 Indeed, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s hearing role was held to 
be unconstitutional in Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 
CLR 245.  
136 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 73(1); Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 
(NT) s 90(1)(a); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 208(1); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) 
s 23(2); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 87(4); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 
(Vic) s 98(1)(b); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 120(a). There appears to be no 
corresponding provision in the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). Complaints in the federal 
jurisdiction are now heard by the federal courts where the rules of evidence do apply.  
137 See, eg, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46P; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 88(1)(a); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 136; Equal 
Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 105.  
138 See, eg, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PK(5); 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 93; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 163; Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 95(6).  
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That a relaxation of the rules of evidence may have actually 
reinforced the use of Briginshaw was averted to by Merkel J in 
Shaw v Wolf.139 His Honour noted that the law of evidence rests 
essentially on principles of fairness. Where the parties do not have 
the protection of the law of evidence, that may be an additional 
reason for exercising greater care in scrutinising evidence not 
admissible in a court of law. Nevertheless this provides no general 
justification for applying Briginshaw, a test created for civil courts 
where the rules of evidence do apply.  
The legislative direction that rules of evidence need not apply in 
anti-discrimination tribunals does not mean that they might not be 
useful. This is especially so if there is a grave danger of injustice 
because some ‘methods of inquiry ... necessarily advantage one 
party and necessarily disadvantage the opposing party.’140 In a 
situation where it could be suggested that respondents are 
benefiting from the imposition of the Briginshaw standard, the 
tribunals could adopt141 a provision such as s 140 of the Evidence 
Act 1995 (NSW). It is cast in similar terms to the Briginshaw test: 
140. Civil proceedings: standard of proof  
(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a 
party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved 
on the balance of probabilities.  
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into 
account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into 
account:  
(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence, and  
(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding, and  
(c) the gravity of the matters alleged. 
                                      
 
139 (1999) 163 ALR 205, 216.  
140 R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228, 256 
(Evatt J).  
141 The provisions in all Australian state anti-discrimination legislation and in the Northern 
Territory allow tribunals to determine their own procedure; for example, by adopting rules of 
evidence, practices and procedures: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 
73(1); Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 90(1)(a); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 
208(1); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 23(2); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 87(4); 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 98(1)(b); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) 
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The Federal Court and Federal Magistrates Court are required to 
apply the rules of evidence to federal discrimination matters. With 
respect, it is suggested that s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), 
which is cast in identical terms to the New South Wales provision, 
could be used instead of the Briginshaw test.142 The general 
adoption of this provision by all anti-discrimination fora would focus 
attention on the correct standard of proof and on the gravity of the 
matter alleged. 
F What Sort of Cases Are Likely to Attract the Briginshaw Test? 
I suggest that in the anti-discrimination jurisdiction there will be 
very limited circumstances that will attract the Briginshaw test. One 
example that comes to mind is McKenna v Victoria.143 Narelle 
McKenna, a former police officer, complained that individual police 
officers had sexually harassed her, discriminated against her on 
the grounds of sex and marital status and had victimised her when 
she complained. She alleged that their employer, the State of 
Victoria, was vicariously liable for the officers’ unlawful conduct. 
The Tribunal found that the nature of the allegations was such that 
some of them (including presumably the complaint relating to a 
fellow officer trying to drag Constable McKenna into a cell for sex) 
‘could equally have been brought as criminal prosecutions’.144 
Taking this into account with the probability that an adverse finding 
would ‘seriously affect the professional reputation and standing in 
the community of the second respondent and could have 
consequences for his career with Victoria Police’,145 the Tribunal 
applied Briginshaw. It found for McKenna and awarded her 
compensation of $125 000, the largest sum ever awarded in 
Australia in a discrimination case. 
Naturally the State and the police officers appealed.146 There were 
54 grounds of appeal, including that the Tribunal had not paid 
sufficient attention to the status and reputation of the respondents 
                                      
 
142 The continued use of the Briginshaw test has been noted by the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission on two occasions: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, Change and Continuity: Review of the Federal Unlawful Discrimination 
Jurisdiction September 2000–September 2002 (2002) 16–19; Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission, Change and Continuity: Review of the Federal Unlawful 
Discrimination Jurisdiction Supplement September 2002–March 2003 (2003) 1.  
143 [1998] EOC ¶92-927.  
144 Ibid 78 164 (Wolters D-P, Members Lanteri and McCallum).  
145 Ibid.  
146 Victoria v McKenna [1999] VSC 310 (Unreported, Smith J, 27 August 1999).  
 
 
31
and had wrongly applied Briginshaw. The appeal was dismissed. 
Smith J of the Victorian Supreme Court noted that just because the 
Tribunal did not expressly mention Briginshaw when discussing 
each allegation, this did not mean that it had been overlooked. His 
Honour held that the Tribunal had carefully followed Dixon J’s 
analysis, paraphrasing and applying each of the principles of 
Briginshaw to all the allegations. However, with due respect, if 
Briginshaw had been correctly applied it should have been only to 
the complaint regarding the use of force against Constable 
McKenna as this raised an allegation of serious criminal conduct.  
Therefore, allegations of sexual harassment that involve physical 
assault would be relevant, as would the possibility that the 
respondent might be struck off his or her professional register.147 
Another type of situation might be where an organisation which 
has been specifically set up to deal with matters of discrimination 
has been accused of discrimination because, if proved, this would 
have a devastating effect on its reputation.148  
G What Are the Consequences of Applying Briginshaw 
Inappropriately? 
It is possible that, in practice, many tribunals do little more than 
pay lip-service to Briginshaw.149 However, its continued use is 
inimical to the spirit and intent of legislation whose aim is to protect 
from unlawful discrimination and harassment, promote equality of 
opportunity and provide equality before the law. For the 
complainant, the misapplication of Briginshaw has a number of 
adverse consequences. 
1 The Parties Are Not Equal before the Law 
                                      
 
147 For example, the respondent medical practitioners accused of sexual harassment in Hall v 
Sheiban [1988] EOC ¶92-227 and Elliott v Nanda (2001) 111 FCR 240. Briginshaw was 
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The evidentiary requirements apparently shift according to the 
status of the respondent. The high status of the respondent should 
not be a factor that influences the clarity of evidence required.  
2 The Wrong Standard of Proof Applied 
By and large the anti-discrimination legislation does not stipulate 
what standard of proof is required.150 This is perhaps unfortunate 
because, as outlined above, even some judges wrongly suggest 
that the requisite standard of proof lies somewhere between the 
balance of probabilities and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3 Uncertainty 
Far from solving the issue of ‘wavering’ proof, the Briginshaw 
approach produces uncertainty. In the absence of a clear 
articulation of the rule, neither tribunals nor parties are sure how 
much evidence is needed to convince the tribunal. This uncertainty 
disadvantages the complainant and favours the respondent where 
the alleged conduct is not grave and serious. 
4 Briginshaw Adds to the Impression that the Jurisdiction Is 
Not ‘User-Friendly’ 
Australian anti-discrimination legislation purports to offer a 
jurisdiction which is easy to access and is relatively free of 
technicalities and legal forms.151 The very nature of the jurisdiction 
means that complainants will generally be vulnerable because of 
disability, race, age, gender or minority status, or because he or 
she has been harassed, vilified or victimised. To run the gauntlet of 
lodging a complaint that is not ‘frivolous, vexatious, misconceived 
or lacking in substance’,152 and then to meet the bewildering 
requirement of proof of the elements to the Briginshaw standard, is 
perhaps more than many complainants would be able to cope with. 
5 Stricter than Other Jurisdictions 
                                      
 
150 There are some exceptions: see, eg, Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ss 204–6.  
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No other jurisdiction routinely demands the rigorous Briginshaw 
standard. Even in the situation where a defendant’s negligence 
may demand millions of dollars in compensation,153 no greater 
proof of evidence is demanded than assessment on the balance of 
probabilities.154  
6 Against All Authority 
The ready acceptance of Briginshaw ‘is apparently at odds with the 
Full Federal Court in State of Victoria v Macedonian Teachers’ 
Association of Victoria Inc, and with the principle stated by the 
High Court in G v H.’155 
VI Conclusion 
According to High Court and other appellate court authority, the 
trigger for applying the Briginshaw test is the possibility that an 
adverse finding will produce a grave consequence for the 
defendant. When that occurs, the tribunal or court must be 
satisfied with the quality of the evidence to prove the allegation. 
Unfortunately, this guidance has been misinterpreted in the anti-
discrimination jurisdiction to mean that because discrimination and 
harassment are serious matters Briginshaw must be applied to all 
cases regardless of the circumstances. The indiscriminate use of 
the principle has undermined the civil standard of proof in this 
jurisdiction and created uncertainty and injustice. Testing the 
nature of the allegation and its possible outcome, as suggested in 
Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service, would restore faith in the 
jurisdiction and fulfil the express objective of the legislation — to 
provide equality between the parties. 
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